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David Brewer is hardly a household name in the contemporary 
legal academy. Most American professors of constitutional law would 
have a hard time placing his nearly twenty-one years of service on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, though most would be savvy enough to guess 
“Lochner era.” He is probably the least well-known of all the Justices 
whose careers are examined in this Symposium. (Brewer’s longtime 
colleague Rufus Peckham is probably his chief contender for this title.) 
For the record, Brewer sat on the Supreme Court from January of 
1890 until his death in March of 1910.1 
In his own era, Brewer was anything but obscure. He played an 
important, and sometimes pivotal, role on the nation’s highest court in 
the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century.2 During his 
 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Marquette University. Visiting Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia. The author wishes to express his special thanks to Jim Ely, Linda Przybyszewski, and 
Sandy Olken for their comments on an earlier version of this Essay. 
 1. Melville Westin Fuller was the Chief Justice during Brewer’s entire tenure on the 
Supreme Court. Fuller assumed the office of Chief Justice in 1888 and served until his death in 
1910, which came a few months after Brewer’s death. For discussion of the Fuller Court 
generally, see JAMES W. ELY, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888–1910 (1995), 
and JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING 
SOCIETY, 1890–1920 (1978). 
 2. See generally ELY, supra note 1; SEMONCHE, supra note 1. For biographical information 
on David Brewer, see generally MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, 1837–1910 (1994). The most important sources of primary materials 
pertaining to Brewer are the Brewer Family Papers at Yale University and Brewer’s papers in 
the Library of Congress. For other primary sources, see the bibliography in the Brodhead 
biography. Id. at 239–52. 
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years on the Court, he authored 540 majority opinions, a total that 
had been exceeded by only five Justices at the time of his death in 
1910.3 He also cast what turned out to be the deciding vote in a 
number of landmark cases, including the Income Tax Case4 (1895), the 
Northern Securities antitrust case5 (1904), and Lochner v. New York6 
(1905). Moreover, he established himself as the leading dissenter on 
the Fuller Court, dissenting even more frequently than “The Great 
Dissenter” John Marshall Harlan.7 During his time on the Court, he 
was also unquestionably the Justice most familiar to the American 
public.8 
Given Brewer’s long service on the Supreme Court and his 
unquestioned prominence in his own time, it is somewhat surprising 
that the Kansan has been so thoroughly “neglected” by constitutional 
scholars and Supreme Court historians. A 1938 Princeton political 
science dissertation9 and a relatively brief biography published in 
1994 by Southern Illinois University Press10 are the only full-length 
studies of Brewer. While there are many articles in law reviews and 
state historical journals that touch on various aspects of his career 
and constitutional views, none has convinced the community of 
constitutional scholars that either his life or his set of ideas is worthy 
of special attention.11 
 
 3. The five Justices who authored a greater number of majority opinions by the time of 
Brewer’s death were Justices Samuel Miller, Stephen Field, Morrison Waite, John Marshall Harlan, 
and Melville W. Fuller. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED 
JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 142–44 (1978). 
Waite and Fuller were Chief Justices and Miller, Field, and Harlan would appear on almost every 
list of “great” Justices. As for the exact number of opinions written by Brewer, there is some 
disagreement. The author’s count of Brewer’s opinions, based on a review of all opinions handed 
down by the Supreme Court during David Brewer’s tenure, is 540 majority opinions, 10 concurring 
opinions, 55 dissenting opinions, and 20 statements. According to a different tabulation, Brewer 
authored 607 opinions which included 533 majority opinions, 8 concurring opinions, 57 dissenting 
opinions, and 9 statements or other opinions. Id. at 144. A search of the LexisNexis Supreme Court 
cases database yields totals of 539 majority opinions, 10 concurring opinions, and 66 dissenting 
opinions. 
 4. Pollack v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 5. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
 6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 7. According to the statistics compiled in BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 3, at 148, 
Brewer dissented an average of 11.3 times per term during his years on the Court. Harlan 
averaged 11.1 dissents per term. Of the other Justices on the Fuller Court only Peckham (10.9) 
and White (10.7) averaged more than 10 dissents per term. Id.  
 8. See discussion infra notes 14–34. 
 9. Lynford A. Lardner, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice David Josiah Brewer (1938) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). 
 10. BRODHEAD, supra note 2. 
 11. Published articles focusing on Brewer’s role on the Court were particularly scarce before 
1990. The literature, such as it was, included Francis Bergan, Mr. Justice Brewer: Perspective of a 
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I. THE PEOPLE’S SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
Brewer’s appeal to his contemporaries was enhanced by his 
compelling life story.12 He was born in 1837 in Smyrna, Asia Minor, 
where his New England missionary parents, the Rev. Josiah Brewer 
and his wife Emilia Field Brewer, operated a missionary school. 
(Living with the Brewers in Smyrna was Mrs. Brewer’s thirteen-year-
old brother Stephen Field, David Brewer’s uncle and future colleague 
on the U.S. Supreme Court.) In 1838, the Brewers returned to New 
England, where the elder Brewer held a variety of educational and 
ministerial positions. David was educated first at Wesleyan College 
and then at Yale, where he was greatly influenced by the political 
scientist and protestant minister Theodore Dwight Woolsey.13 At Yale 
he was also a classmate of his future Supreme Court colleague Henry 
Billings Brown. 
After graduating from Yale in 1856, Brewer spent one year 
studying law in the office of his uncle David Dudley Field in New York 
City and then a second year at the Albany Law School, from which he 
graduated in 1858. During this time, Brewer—who shared his 
abolitionist father’s belief in reform—became radicalized by the debate 
over slavery and particularly by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dred Scott 
decision, which Brewer viewed as reprehensible. Following his 
graduation from Albany, he moved—at the height of the battle over 
slavery in Kansas—to Kansas City, Missouri, where he contemplated 
starting a law practice. After an unsuccessful few months practicing 
law, he ventured to Colorado in search of gold, only to return empty-
 
Century, 25 ALB. L. REV. 191 (1961); D. Stanley Eitzen, David J. Brewer, 1837–1910: A Kansan on 
the United States Supreme Court, 12 EMPORIA ST. RES. STUD. 1 (1964); Owen M. Fiss, David J. 
Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 53 (1986); and Ralph E. Gamer, 
Justice Brewer and Substantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REV. 615 
(1965). 
 Although the flow still resembles a trickle more than a torrent, there has been a slight 
increase in the number of scholarly articles about Brewer since 1990. These include: Steven K. 
Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the “Christian Nation” Maxim, 63 ALB. L. REV. 427 (1999); 
J. Gordon Hylton, David Josiah Brewer: A Conservative Justice Reconsidered, 94 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 45 
(1994) [hereinafter Hylton, Conservative Justice]; J. Gordon Hylton, David Josiah Brewer and the 
Christian Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 417 (1998) [hereinafter Hylton, Christian Constitution]; J. 
Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the 
Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315 (1991) [hereinafter Hylton, Judge Who Abstained]; Linda 
Przybyszewski, Judicial Conservatism and Protestant Faith: The Case of Justice David J. 
Brewer, 91 J. AM. HIST. 471, 476 (2004); and William M. Wiecek, Justice David J. Brewer and 
“the Constitution in Exile,” 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 170 (2008). 
 12. The following biographical sketch is based upon BRODHEAD, supra note 2, and the 
Hylton articles, supra note 11. 
 13. Woolsey was also president of Yale from 1846 to 1871. For Woolsey’s influence on 
Brewer, see Hylton, Christian Constitution, supra note 11, at 420–22. 
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handed to Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1859, where he would remain 
until his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1889. 
In Leavenworth, Brewer practiced law (though not very 
successfully) and held a variety of public positions, including 
commissioner for the local federal circuit court, superintendent of 
schools, judge of the county probate court, and later state district court 
judge. In 1870, he was elected to the Kansas Supreme Court, on which 
he served until he was appointed judge of the U.S. Eighth Circuit 
Court in 1884. In 1889, President Benjamin Harrison named Brewer 
to the U.S. Supreme Court to replace the recently deceased Justice 
Stanley Matthews. The U.S. Senate confirmed his appointment that 
December. 
Brewer’s appointment to the Supreme Court made him a 
national figure, and he never hesitated to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by his new position. As a state and federal judge 
in Kansas, he had spoken regularly in public and published his views 
on a variety of topics in a wide range of publications. After 1890, he 
moved these activities to a national stage, and it was his off-the-bench 
opinions rather than his judicial decisions that caught the attention of 
the American public. 
When Brewer died suddenly at age seventy-two on March 27, 
1910, obituaries in the nation’s leading newspapers not only 
remembered him as a great jurist but also celebrated the role that he 
had played in making the Supreme Court accessible to the general 
public. As the New York Times put it:  
Of all the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States[,] David J. Brewer was the 
best known to the people. They saw more of him. It was his habit, upon occasion, to put 
aside the robe of the Justice, the manner and the speech of the bench, and to address his 
fellow-citizens from lecture platforms upon matters that concerned them all.14  
According to the Chicago Tribune, “Justice Brewer’s death will be a 
big loss to the public in other ways than as a member of the bench. He 
was the only member of the bench who freely expressed his opinion on 
large public questions.”15 That same newspaper also noted that 
Brewer “was the one member of the Supreme [C]ourt who was in 
almost constant demand as a lecturer and after-dinner speaker.”16 
The Washington Post was particularly effusive, proclaiming 
that during his years on the Supreme Court, Brewer  
had become the embodiment of the ideals cherished by the people in respect to those 
chosen to sit in the temple of justice. His public monument is his own pure fame as a 
 
 14. Justice Brewer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1910, at 10. 
 15. Justice Brewer Dies Suddenly, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 29, 1910, at 1. 
 16. Id. at 6. 
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judge. . . . He had become like one of the fathers of the republic, whose voice was the 
voice of wisdom, understanding, and patriotism.17  
Even a progressive journal like Outlook, which was critical of many of 
Brewer’s views on law and politics, acknowledged his prominence and 
popularity. It described Brewer as “one of the most widely known and 
popular of all the judges who have ever sat upon the Federal Supreme 
Court bench,” and it noted:  
It is probable that among the names of the Supreme Court Justices whom most people 
would recall there would be found his. This was largely because more than any other 
Supreme Court Justice in recent years Justice Brewer appeared before popular 
audiences and spoke his mind freely on public questions.18  
The Virginia Law Register, a law journal, described the late Justice as 
a man who “mingled with the people and addressed his 
countrymen . . . upon matters concerning the general welfare” and 
who “did not hesitate to express vigorous opinion upon all the great 
questions of the day.”19 
The Proquest Historical Newspapers database confirms 
Brewer’s visibility to the public. A search for stories with references to 
the Supreme Court Justices of the Fuller Court era reveals that the 
three Justices whose names appeared most frequently in the popular 
press were Chief Justice Melville Fuller, Associate Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, and David Brewer. Although Fuller was the Chief 
Justice and Harlan was the Court’s senior member for most of 
Brewer’s tenure, it is Brewer’s name that appears most frequently. In 
the twenty-one-year period between January 1, 1890, and January 1, 
1911, there are 2,024 articles that mention Chief Justice Fuller, 2,634 
that mention Justice Harlan, and 3,038 that mention Justice Brewer. 
While the stories that mention Fuller and Harlan almost always do so 
in the context of the Supreme Court itself, the Brewer stories 
frequently discuss him in the context of events (usually speaking 
engagements) that have little direct connection to the Court.20 
As his eulogists acknowledged, Brewer’s fame was largely the 
product of his love of public speaking and his willingness to go almost 
anywhere to address an audience. He spoke to bar associations, to 
missionary groups, to churches, to life insurance agents, at public 
health conferences, at conferences on international arbitration, at 
graduation ceremonies of prestigious and not-so-prestigious colleges, 
 
 17. Death of Justice Brewer, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1910, at 6. 
 18. Mr. Justice Brewer, 94 OUTLOOK 785, 785 (1910). 
 19. Mr. Justice Brewer, 16 VA. L. REG. 65, 65 (1910). 
 20. This is based on the version of Proquest available through the University of Virginia 
Library in March of 2008. 
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at all-black colleges, and at football dinners. He was wonderfully 
democratic in that regard. When the Supreme Court recessed, Brewer 
usually could be found heading for the Washington train station to 
travel to yet another destination to deliver a public address. His 
papers contain almost two hundred manuscript addresses, but 
contemporary newspaper accounts suggest that his number of public 
addresses far exceeded that total.21 
Brewer also regularly contributed articles—often very thinly 
reworked versions of his public addresses—to the popular and 
religious presses of his day, and many of his other addresses were 
published in pamphlets or expanded to book form.22 One could read 
about Brewer’s views on lynching in Leslie’s Weekly;23 on juries in 
International Monthly;24 on African-American education in the 
Southern Workman;25 on individual liberty, organized wealth and the 
judiciary, and the right to appeal in The Independent;26 on the 
religious life of judges in Outlook;27 on the prospects for international 
peace in Christian Endeavor World;28 on women’s suffrage in Ladies 
World;29 on the importance of the YMCA in Intercollegian;30 on the 
legality of Jesus’s conviction and execution in Sunday School Times;31 
and on the Green Mountain State in The Vermonter.32 In addition, he 
edited a ten-volume series entitled The World’s Best Essays; he edited 
a second ten-volume series, The World’s Best Orations; and he co-
authored a short treatise on international law with Supreme Court 
Reporter Charles Henry Butler.33 Historian Linda Przybyszewski has 
 
 21. Brewer Family Papers (on file with the Yale University Sterling Memorial Library); 
Papers of David J. Brewer (on file with the Library of Congress Manuscript Division). 
 22. For a nearly complete list of Brewer’s published articles and books, see BRODHEAD, 
supra note 2, at 241–43, 247–49. 
 23. David J. Brewer, Plain Words on the Crime of Lynching, 97 LESLIE’S WKLY. 182 (1903). 
 24. David J. Brewer, The Jury, 5 INT’L MONTHLY 1, 1–9 (1902). 
 25. David J. Brewer, Justice Brewer’s Address, 35 S. WORKMAN 359, 359–61 (1906). 
 26. David J. Brewer, The Liberty of Each Individual, 45 INDEP. 2 (1903); David J. Brewer, 
Organized Wealth and the Judiciary, 57 INDEP. 301 (1904); David J. Brewer, The Right of Appeal, 
55 INDEP. 2547 (1903). 
 27. David J. Brewer, The Religion of a Jurist, 80 OUTLOOK 533, 533–36 (1905). 
 28. David J. Brewer, A Second Hague Conference: What May Be Expected From It, 19 
CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOR WORLD 787, 787–88 (1905). 
 29. David J. Brewer, Woman Suffrage: Its Present Position and Its Future, 30 LADIES’ 
WORLD 6, 6, 29 (1909). 
 30. David J. Brewer, The Young Men’s Christian Association and American Solidarity, 27 
INTERCOLLEGIAN 101, 101–03 (1905). 
 31. David J. Brewer, Were Christ’s Trial and Death Legal?, 1906 SUNDAY SCH. TIMES 665, 
665–66. 
 32. David J. Brewer, The Green Mountain State, 1 VERMONTER 125, 125–26 (1896). 
 33. DAVID J. BREWER & CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (1906); 
THE WORLD’S BEST ESSAYS: FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME (David J. Brewer 
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described Brewer as “probably the most widely read jurist in the 
United States at the turn of the century.”34 
In addition to his public speaking and writing, Brewer served 
in a variety of high-profile public positions during his tenure on the 
Supreme Court. In 1895, he temporarily took leave of his Supreme 
Court duties to serve as president of the Venezuela-British Guiana 
Border Commission, and he was a regular participant at the Lake 
Mohonk, New York, conferences on world peace. In 1904, he served as 
president of the Universal Congress of Lawyers and Jurists, held in 
conjunction with the St. Louis World’s Fair, and in 1907, he was one of 
the founders of the American Society of International Law. A longtime 
officer of the American Home Missionary Association, Brewer was also 
an active supporter of the Associated Charities of Washington, D.C. In 
addition, he was actively involved with the legal profession, and he 
served as a member of the committee that drafted the American Bar 
Association’s 1908 Canons of Ethics. Throughout his years in 
Washington, Brewer was a part-time professor of constitutional and 
international law at the Columbian Law School (now the law school of 
George Washington University). Although part of Brewer’s motivation 
for his off-the-bench career was financial—he had no significant 
financial assets or income other than his judge’s salary—Brewer 
derived great satisfaction from the public attention and admiration 
that he received for his extrajudicial activities. 
II. THE ARCH-CONSERVATIVE DEFENDER OF PROPERTY 
Not everyone was enamored with Brewer’s penchant for public 
appearances. His Supreme Court colleague Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
while insisting that he liked Brewer personally, labeled him an enfant 
terrible in a letter to his English friend Frederick Pollock. In the 
letter, he also mocked Brewer’s “itch for public speaking.”35 Edwin 
Corwin, who began his long scholarly career while Brewer was still on 
the bench, later noted that “Justice Brewer was inordinately fond of the 
lecture platform, doing his best to restore the old Federalist conception 
of the judges as moral mentors of the people.”36 During his final years on 
 
ed., 1900); THE WORLD’S BEST ORATIONS: FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 
(David J. Brewer ed., 1899). 
 34. Przybyszewski, supra note 11, at 476. 
 35. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 1, 1910), in 1 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 160, 160 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
 36. EDWIN S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 198 n.41 (1938). 
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the Court, Brewer’s public remarks became increasingly political and 
often were targeted at progressive initiatives. President Theodore 
Roosevelt in particular was the target of harsh criticism from Brewer. 
Roosevelt, in turn, detested Brewer and privately described him as a 
“menace to the welfare of the Nation”37 and as a judge who had “a 
sweetbread for a brain.”38 To Roosevelt, Brewer was “one of the 
corporation judges whose presence on the bench has been a source of 
grave discredit and weakness to it.”39 
If one looks at the trajectory of Brewer’s post-1910 reputation, 
a distinct pattern emerges. For two decades after his death, public 
opinion of Brewer was divided. Some students of the Court, including 
liberals like Felix Frankfurter and Jerome Frank, remembered David 
Brewer as an important and influential Justice.40 However, following 
the lead of Theodore Roosevelt, other progressive commentators 
shortly after Brewer’s death began to describe him as an arch-
conservative judge who placed the interests of American corporate 
plutocrats ahead of those of the general public. He was derided as an 
apostle of laissez-faire, a social Darwinist, an individual woefully out of 
touch with the social realities of his day, and a political reactionary 
whose true agenda was the advancement of the interests of large 
business enterprises. 
In his history of the Supreme Court published shortly after 
Brewer’s death, the muckraking journalist Gustavus Myers described 
Brewer as a Justice who “indoctrinated law in accordance with the 
demands of capitalist interests,”41 while the progressive journal Outlook 
somewhat more charitably described him as one who “followed the 
standards of an individualistic age from which [this magazine] believes 
the country is emerging.”42 Even Henry Billings Brown, Brewer’s Yale 
classmate and colleague on the Supreme Court (and hardly a judicial 
 
 37. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Lewis Stimson (Feb. 5, 1912), in 7 THE 
LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 494, 495 (Elting E. Morrison ed., 1954) [hereinafter LETTERS 
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT]. 
 38. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (July 27, 1930), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–
1935, at 1268, 1270 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
 39. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to William Allen White (Nov. 26, 1907), in 5 LETTERS OF 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 37, at 855, 855. 
 40. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 788 
(1957). For Frankfurter’s view of Brewer, see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 10–11 (2d ed. 1985) 
(describing Frankfurter’s list of “great” Supreme Court Justices). 
 41. GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 739 (1918). 
 42. Mr. Justice Brewer, supra note 18, at 786. 
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radical), identified him after his death as one who embraced “the 
conservative views . . . regarding the rights of property.”43 
After the 1930s, favorable views of Brewer almost disappeared. 
He and most of his Fuller Court colleagues were linked with the Four 
Horsemen of the 1920s as examples of Justices who participated in the 
corporate takeover of the American judiciary. Brewer was described 
variously as the “leader of the ultraconservative economic laissez-faire 
advocates on the Court”;44 one of “the tough-minded twins of ultra-
conservatism”;45 the “William O. Douglas of the Right”;46 a “firm believer 
in laissez faire”;47 “that old laissez-faire advocate”;48 a “vigorous propo-
nent of judicial sanctions for laissez-faire conservatism”;49 a judge who 
possessed a “conservative commitment to a rigidly circumscribed concept 
of government regulatory authority”;50 one who stood in “staunch 
defense of the rights of liberty and property”;51 and an individual whose 
“thought turned in upon legal principles instead of expanding outward 
to an examination of the economic and social conditions to which law is 
intended to apply.”52 
Reflecting the new consensus, historian Arnold Paul wrote of 
Brewer in the mid-1960s: 
Brewer held to a strictly conservative, sometimes reactionary, position on the Court, 
opposing firmly the expansion of government regulatory power, state or federal. [He 
was] an outspoken and doctrinaire conservative who made little pretense of “judicial 
self-restraint” and few compromises to Court consensus. . . . [He was] dogmatic and 
ultraconservative in a wide spectrum of social, political, and judicial matters. What 
Brewer represented was both an older kind of conservatism, manifested by such themes 
as a Puritan stress on obligation and character, an acceptance of social stratification (in 
conjunction with an insistence on social order), and a belief in noblesse oblige—and a 
newer kind more representative of his contemporary milieu, highly materialistic and 
property-conscious, elitist in the Social Darwinian sense, and fearful of the social 
challenges accompanying the growth of industrialism.53 
 
 43. MEMOIR OF HENRY BILLINGS BROWN: LATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 32 (Charles A. Kent ed., 1915). 
 44. ABRAHAM, supra note 40, at 147–48. 
 45. FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 
1955, at 187 (1955). The other “twin” was Rufus Peckham. Id. 
 46. ALAN F. WESTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 24 (1963). 
 47. SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 136 (1956). 
 48. LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1877–1917, at 185 
(1971). 
 49. 5 LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 37, at 397 n.1. 
 50. WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD 
LEGALITY, 1889–1932, at 93 (1969). 
 51. CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 563 (1943). 
 52. Lardner, supra note 9, at 221. 
 53. Arnold M. Paul, David J. Brewer, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT, 1789–1978, at 1515, 1520 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980); see also ARNOLD M. 
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Until the late 1970s, this view of Brewer and his Fuller Court colleagues 
held sway among constitutional scholars and historians. At that point in 
history, one could have made the argument that Brewer was not worthy 
of attention because his ideas were so corrupt and outdated that little 
could be gained by studying his career. 
III. BREWER AND FULLER COURT REVISIONISM 
The scholarship of the past three decades convincingly has 
demolished the view of the Fuller Court as little more than a water 
carrier for corporate America. This literature has emphasized that the 
Justices of the Waite and Fuller Courts were part of a constitutional 
tradition rooted in the liberalism of antebellum America and charac-
terized by hostility to government-sanctioned monopolies and a belief in 
the sanctity of free labor.54 Initially, this reevaluation did little to 
rehabilitate the reputation of David Brewer. What resulted was a new 
consensus that, while the Fuller Court as a whole was not nearly as 
committed to the protection of property and the principles of laissez-faire 
as its progressive critics had claimed, such charges were fair when 
applied to David Brewer (and usually to Rufus Peckham as well). 
Consequently, during the 1980s and the early 1990s, even while 
scholarly attitudes toward the Fuller Court as a whole softened, Brewer 
continued to be described as one who stood in the “forefront of the 
 
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895, at 
70–72 (1960) (describing Brewer’s 1891 Yale commencement address, Protection to Private Property 
from Public Attack). 
 54. See generally ELY, supra note 1. “Fuller Court revisionism” began in the late 1970s with the 
work of Charles McCurdy and John Semonche playing leading roles. See Charles W. McCurdy, 
Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975); Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight 
Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporate Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 302 (1979); Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of “Liberty of Contract” Reconsidered: Major 
Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867–1937, 1984 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 20; see also 
SEMONCHE, supra note 1. 
 For later examples of the literature that led to this reevaluation of the Fuller Court, see 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA 
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1–18 (1993); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW, 1836–1937 (1991); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-
Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 
293 (1985); James W. Ely, Jr., Judicial Liberalism in the Gilded Age: Appraising John Marshall 
Harlan, 21 REV. AM. HIST. 57, 57–62 (1993); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and 
the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991); and Melvin I. Urofsky, State 
Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63 
(1985). For a discussion of the historiography of the Fuller Court prior to 1975, see Mary 
Cornelia Porter, That Commerce Shall Be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-Faire Court, 1976 
SUP. CT. REV. 135, 135–59. 
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Court’s assault on social legislation,”55 a judge who “forged conservative 
socioeconomic beliefs into constitutional doctrine” and “unabashedly 
relied on judicial power to protect private property rights from the 
supposed incursions of state and federal legislatures,”56 and one whose 
“overriding purpose was to limit and structure state interventions into 
the economy and to affirm the idea of limited government.”57 Scholars 
labeled Brewer as a “doctrinaire conservative” who was “the most 
formalist member of the Court at the time”58 and “one of the most 
conservative members of a notoriously conservative bench . . . obsessed 
with the importance of private property to the preservation of a free and 
just society.”59 By advancing a more moderate interpretation of the 
Fuller Court as a body, some revisionist historians actually made 
Brewer seem even more of a reactionary figure than before. 
Given the seeming uniformity of “liberal” scholarly opinion 
regarding Brewer’s conservatism, a “David Brewer revival” might have 
been expected with the rise of conservative constitutional theories in the 
1980s. Yet Brewer’s name went largely unmentioned by the advocates of 
Reaganite constitutionalism. Neither Ronald Reagan nor anyone else in 
the 1980s called for the appointment of “more David Josiah Brewers” to 
the Supreme Court.60 
IV. DAVID BREWER REVISIONISM 
In his 1978 study, Charting the Future: The Supreme Court 
Responds to a Changing Society, 1888-1920, historian John Semonche 
argued that Brewer’s record on the Court showed that he was more 
pragmatic than ideological and that his reputation as an “arch 
 
 55. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 
1888–1986, at 82 (1990). 
 56. Kermit L. Hall, Brewer, David J. (1837–1910), in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 240, 240 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
 57. Fiss, supra note 11, at 58. 
 58. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 121, 
126 (1988). 
 59. Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over 
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 215–16 (1984). 
 60. This is difficult to document, but in the LexisNexis newspaper/news magazine database, 
there is only one story published before January 1, 1993 that mentions both Ronald Reagan and 
David Brewer and that is a 1984 Time magazine story about religion in schools that mentions in 
passing Brewer’s opinion in the Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 
(1892) (declaring the United States to be a Christian nation). This is also apparently the only 
mention of Brewer in the database prior to January 1993. While the pre-1993 LexisNexis 
database is much less extensive than the modern version, there are in excess of 3000 stories that 
include the terms “Reagan,” “Supreme Court” and “appointment.” (The database will not return 
a total for the number of qualifying sources if the number is larger than 3000.) 
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conservative” was in need of reconsideration. At the time, very few 
historians and legal scholars picked up on that suggestion.61 However, in 
the 1990s a small number of scholars demonstrated that Brewer’s 
overall record on the Court was more moderate than his critics had 
maintained. Assertions of Brewer’s extremism usually had been based 
on specific references to his intemperate language in a small number of 
opinions and public addresses and not on his overall record on the 
Supreme Court.62 
It is true that, at the time of his appointment to the Supreme 
Court, Brewer already had a reputation as a defender of property 
rights. He angered the prohibitionists in his own state—even though 
Brewer himself supported prohibition—by ruling that the state had to 
compensate the owners of breweries and distilleries that were 
rendered virtually worthless by the enactment of the prohibition 
amendment to the Kansas Constitution in 1880.63 Similarly, his 
nomination to the Supreme Court had been opposed by the Kansas 
Grange, which viewed his judicial decisions as insufficiently 
sympathetic to the cause of railroad rate regulation. Brewer accepted 
the legitimacy of rate regulation but insisted that rates had to be set 
high enough for the railroad to earn a reasonable return on its 
investment. He also believed that courts properly could determine the 
reasonableness of rates. Some southern senators also opposed Brewer 
because they believed that he was too sympathetic to African-
Americans.64 
A handful of strident public addresses delivered shortly after 
his appointment to the Court enhanced Brewer’s reputation as a 
defender of property rights. Particularly provocative were “The 
Protection of Property from Public Attack” (delivered at his alma 
mater Yale and published as a magazine article and as a pamphlet) 
and “The Movement toward Coercion” (an address before the New 
York State Bar Association in 1893, which also was published as a 
 
 61. SEMONCHE, supra note 1, at 244–45. 
 62. The principle works of “Brewer revisionism” since 1978 are BRODHEAD, supra note 2; 
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 38–63, 319–20 (2000), 
even though Brewer is a relatively minor character in the overall work; and Hylton, Conservative 
Justice, supra note 11. 
 63. Kansas v. Walruff, 26 F. 178, 199 (C.C.D. Kan. 1886). This decision was effectively 
overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887), 
which was decided while Brewer was still a Judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 64. For Brewer’s complicated relationship to the question of African-American rights, see 
Hylton, Judge Who Abstained, supra note 11. On Southern opposition to his appointment to the 
Supreme Court from within his circuit because of his racial views, see BRODHEAD, supra note 2, 
at 75. 
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pamphlet).65 Moreover, during his time on the Supreme Court, Brewer 
was found in the majority of what used to be thought of as the most 
“notorious” pro-property decisions of the Fuller Court: Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota (1890);66 Pollack v. 
Farmer’s Loan & Trust (the income tax case, 1895);67 United States v. 
E. C. Knight Co. (1895);68 In re Debs (Brewer’s opinion, 1895);69 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897);70 Smyth v. Ames (affirming a lower court 
opinion by Brewer, 1896);71 Lochner v. New York (1905);72 Adair v. 
United States (1908);73 and Berea College v. Kentucky (1908).74 In 
addition, Brewer dissented in several cases in which the Court voted 
to uphold regulatory legislation in the tradition of Munn v. Illinois.75 
The most famous example is the grain elevator regulation case Budd 
v. New York,76 in which Brewer bitterly proclaimed that “[t]he 
paternal theory of government is to me odious” and predicted that 
such decisions were making the vision of Edward Bellamy’s Looking 
Backward (which Brewer seemingly read as a dystopian work) “nearer 
than a dream.”77 
However, a closer examination of Brewer’s judicial record and 
his off-the-bench writings reveals the inadequacy of the various views 
of Brewer as a social Darwinist, a corporate henchman, or some sort of 
extreme economic libertarian. More thorough studies of Brewer’s actual 
voting patterns on the Court demonstrate that he was not nearly the 
doctrinaire opponent of the police power that his critics have made him 
out to be; nor was he the unrestrained defender of corporate interests 
that many assumed.78 
 
 65. DAVID JOSIAH BREWER, THE MOVEMENT OF COERCION (1893); David Josiah Brewer, 
Protection of Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 97 (1891). 
 66. 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
 67. 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
 68. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 69. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
 70. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 71. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The lower court opinion was Ames v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F. 165 
(C.C.D. Neb. 1894). 
 72. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 73. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
 74. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). Brewer did not participate in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 552 (1896), in which the Court upheld the doctrine of separate but equal. Hylton, Judge 
Who Abstained, supra note 11, at 341–44. 
 75. 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1878). 
 76. 143 U.S. 517, 548–52 (1892). 
 77. Id. at 551. 
 78. Brewer’s voting record is analyzed in detail in Hylton, Conservative Justice, supra note 11, 
at 48–54. 
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Frequently, Brewer’s bark proved to be worse than his bite. 
While Brewer supported judicial review of the reasonableness of state 
railroad rates in Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (1894)79 and 
Smyth v. Ames (1898),80 in nine subsequent rate cases that came 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, Brewer voted to uphold challenged 
state regulatory schedules eight times.81 When Brewer came to the 
Supreme Court in 1890, he was committed to overturning Munn v. 
Illinois,82 the Supreme Court’s 1877 decision that upheld the authority 
of states to regulate rates charged by certain unincorporated 
businesses that were affected with a public interest. However, after 
his colleagues rebuffed his efforts to overturn Munn in Budd v. New 
York (1892)83 and Brass v. North Dakota (1894),84 he gave up and 
accepted the legitimacy of the earlier decision.85 
For all his rhetoric regarding the sanctity of property rights, 
Brewer was surprisingly reluctant to use the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendments as barriers to state regulation of property. Only twice in 
his twenty years on the Supreme Court did he file a written dissent in a 
case in which the majority determined that no taking of property had oc-
curred.86 On the other hand, he often could be found defending the 
state’s action when other Justices felt compensation was necessary. In 
regard to Brewer’s approach to takings cases, historian John Semonche, 
after examining Brewer’s opinions from his entire stint on the Supreme 
Court, wrote: “Based upon such opinions Brewer must be seen as a 
 
 79. 154 U.S. 362, 393–94 (1894). 
 80. 169 U.S. 466, 545–46 (1898). Brewer authored the Court’s opinion in Reagan and the 
lower circuit court opinion that Smyth upheld. 
 81. Brewer voted to uphold challenged rate schedules in several cases. R.R. Comm’n of La. v. 
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 212 U.S. 414, 428 (1909); Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 54 
(1909); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 88 (1907); Ala. & Vicksburg Ry. 
Co. v. Miss. R.R. Comm’n, 203 U.S. 496, 500 (1906) (opinion of Brewer, J.); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. 
Florida, 203 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1906) (opinion of Brewer, J.); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. 
Minnesota, 186 U.S. 257, 268–69 (1902); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 
505 (1902); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167, 174 (1900) (opinion of 
Brewer, J.). Only in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908), did he side with the party challenging 
the rate schedule. 
 82. 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1877). 
 83. 143 U.S. 517, 548–52 (1892). 
 84. 153 U.S. 391, 405–10 (1894). 
 85. See Cotting v. Kan. City Stockyard Co., 183 U.S. 79, 84 (1901) (opinion of Brewer, J., 
acknowledging that he was abandoning his assault on Munn). 
 86. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 596–601 (1906); Chi., 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 259–63 (1897). In a few other cases, he joined 
in another Justice’s dissent, as in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 144 (1894) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting), 
or else dissented without opinion, as in Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 469 (1896). 
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Justice who was quite sensitive to the need to grant considerable 
latitude to the states.”87 
Any effort to characterize Brewer as a resolute opponent of the 
police power on ideological grounds cannot be squared with his overall 
record between 1890 and 1910. In cases involving challenges to state 
regulatory authority on any constitutional basis—the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Contracts Clause, the Commerce Clause—Brewer 
approved of the state’s regulatory efforts almost 80% of the time. In 
739 cases, Brewer sided with the state 589 times, and those were, of 
course, cases in which the private parties seeking to overturn state 
regulation viewed themselves as having a sufficiently likely chance of 
prevailing to warrant the cost of litigating all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.88 The Supreme Court as a whole upheld the state in 
83.8% of these cases, making Brewer only slightly more “opposed” to 
the police power than the Court as a whole. 
In fact, of the twenty Justices who sat on the Fuller Court, nine 
sided with private parties more frequently than Brewer (who sided 
with the private party in 20.6% of cases). Included in this group were 
longtime colleagues Stephen Field (23.9%), John Marshall Harlan 
(23.5%), Edward White (21.4%), and Henry Billings Brown (20.6%). 
Brewer was most likely to find regulatory legislation unconstitutional 
when federal rather than state regulation was at issue, although here 
also his overall voting record shows that he sided with the federal 
government in a slight majority of cases.89 
Moreover, efforts to characterize Brewer as a defender of 
corporate interests either ignore, or are ignorant of, Brewer’s regular 
denunciations of excessive corporate power in his on- and off-the-
bench writings. Throughout his career, Brewer repeatedly expressed 
concern about the growing power of large business enterprises in 
American society. In 1880, while a judge on the Kansas Supreme Court, 
he publicly called for a new state constitution so that his adopted state 
would be better able to deal with “gigantic corporations [that] are 
accumulating great properties, and will soon be found wrestling for 
 
 87. SEMONCHE, supra note 1, at 119. 
 88. The statistics in this paragraph are taken from a detailed study of Brewer’s voting 
patterns in cases involving constitutional challenges to state and federal regulatory activities. 
Hylton, Conservative Justice, supra note 11, at 48. 
 89. Id. at 48–50 (discussing Brewer’s voting patterns in federal cases). While Brewer was 
reluctant to recognize the expansion of federal legislative power—opposing it in almost half of the 
cases—Edward Purcell has argued persuasively that Brewer strongly supported the expansion of 
federal judicial power, a position that was consistent with his faith in the ability of judges to 
mediate constitutional disputes. PURCELL, supra note 62, at 38–63. 
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political power and control.”90 He decried the “accumulated fortunes” of 
the day as a “danger to all free institutions and a menace to popular 
government,” and he was an early critic of the Standard Oil monopoly.91 
As a state and federal court judge in Kansas, he compiled an extensive 
record of upholding state regulatory legislation in the face of constitu-
tional claims of corporate appellants, and in 1889, newspapers as 
diverse as the New York World and the Burlington, Iowa, Hawkeye 
endorsed his nomination to the Supreme Court on the ground that he 
was a judge who had refused to accede to the wishes of corporations and 
monopolies.92 
While a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, he characterized corporate 
action as “often selfish, remorseless, and cruel” and branded efforts to 
“crush out opposition” violations of “the first principles of the 
Declaration of Independence.”93 He favored granting the states great 
leeway to tax large national corporations, and he regularly supported 
prosecutions under the Sherman Antitrust Act, casting the crucial fifth 
vote for the government in the landmark cases United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass’n.94 and Northern Securities v. United States.95 In 
 
 90. David Josiah Brewer, Constitutional Convention, 3 W. HOMESTEAD 70 (1880), quoted in 
Lardner, supra note 9, at 127. 
 91. David Josiah Brewer, The Scholar in Politics, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, June 13, 1883, 
quoted in Lardner, supra note 9, at 128. He expressed his antipathy to the practices of Standard Oil 
in Burlington, Cedar Rapids & N. Ry. Co. v. Nw. Fuel Co., 31 F. 652, 657 (C.C.D. Minn. 1887). 
 92. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Dey, 38 F. 656, 662 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1889) 
(upholding power of the board of railroad commissioners to determine reasonableness of rates); State 
v. Kan. City, Ft. Scott & G. R.R. Co., 32 F. 722, 725 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1887) (upholding state legislation 
requiring railroad companies to erect a depot at crossings); National Water-Works Co. of N.Y. v. City 
of Kansas, 28 F. 921, 923 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1886) (upholding state legislation allowing regulation over 
the operation of water-works companies); Missouri v. Bell Tel. Co., 23 F. 539, 540–41 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 
1885) (requiring telephone company to permit communication to companies other than those 
permitted by its license from the patentee); Sherman v. Anderson, 27 Kan. 333, 335–36 (1882) 
(upholding state legislation requiring railroad to fence railroad tracks to keep out cattle); Kan. Pac. 
Ry. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573, 575 (1876) (upholding state legislation concerning the killing or 
wounding of stock by railroads); State v. Comm’rs of Nemaha County, 7 Kan. 542, 549 (1871) 
(opposing in dissent writ of mandamus of the railroad to compel commissioners to issue bonds). For 
the newspaper endorsements, see undated newspaper clippings in the Brewer Family Papers. 
 93. David Josiah Brewer, Some Thoughts About Kansas, 12 KAN. BAR ASS’N REP. 61, 69 (1895); 
David Josiah Brewer, Address to the Association of Agents of the Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Company (1908) (on file with Yale University in the Brewer Family Papers, box 5, 
folder 186). For an elaboration of Brewer’s dislike of the predatory practices of large corporations, see 
David Josiah Brewer, Organized Wealth and the Judiciary, 57 INDEP. 301, 301–03 (1904), and David 
Josiah Brewer, Our National Opportunities (Nov. 28, 1907), reported in Protect Everybody, Brewer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1907, at 14. 
 94. 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897). 
 95. 193 U.S. 197, 331 (1904). Other cases in which Brewer voted to uphold prosecutions under 
the Sherman Act include Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); Montague & Co. v. 
Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 46 (1904); and Addystone Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 
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1903, he actually was criticized by the New York Sun for being too 
harsh in his criticism of corporate efforts to influence legislative 
behavior.96 
Brewer certainly was concerned about the protection of 
property rights, but to characterize him as an unrelenting advocate of 
corporate interests or as a doctrinaire ideologue is to ignore what 
actually happened during his twenty years on the Supreme Court.97 
V. BREWER’S APPROACH TO DECIDING CASES 
Disproving the claims of Brewer’s detractors reopens the 
question of Brewer’s significance in the history of the Supreme Court. 
If he was not the preeminent defender of property rights and the 
interests of corporations, what was his significance? If he was a 
central figure on the Supreme Court for more than two decades—
which he was—and if his constitutional views were not necessarily 
extreme or highly objectionable, why is it that so little attention has 
been paid to his career and even less to his opinions? 
First of all, few of Brewer’s opinions are counted among the 
landmark decisions of American constitutional law. A list of ten 
“noteworthy” Brewer opinions compiled in 2006 by Kermit Hall 
included four of his dissenting opinions98 plus majority decisions in 
Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,99 In re Debs,100 Kansas v. 
Colorado,101 Muller v. Oregon,102 Berea College v. Kentucky,103 and 
Keller v. United States.104 Except for Muller, in which Brewer upheld 
the constitutionality of a statute setting maximum hours for women 
workers, these opinions generally are viewed as being on the wrong 
side of history, either deferring too excessively to state authority 
(Kansas v. Colorado, Berea College, and Keller), being too hostile to 
 
(1899). The principal case in which Brewer exhibited his approval of state taxation of national 
corporations was Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S 185, 225 (1897). 
 96. The New York Sun’s criticisms were reprinted in the WICHITA EAGLE, Nov. 26, 1904, at 
1 (on file with Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas). 
 97. In a recently published article that focuses primarily on the better known cases of the 
Fuller Court, William Wiecek reaches a similar conclusion regarding the complex character of 
Brewer’s constitutional views and his decisions in actual cases. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 183. 
 98. For this list, see BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 73 (Melvin 
Urofsky ed., 2006). 
 99. 154 U.S. 362 (1894). 
 100. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
 101. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
 102. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 103. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
 104. 213 U.S. 138 (1909). 
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state regulation of private business (Reagan), or being too insensitive 
to the interests of organized labor (Debs). (The four dissenting 
opinions echo similar themes.105) Such opinions are not truly 
characteristic of Brewer’s overall record on the Court. One also could 
argue that such a list should include Brewer’s concurring opinion in 
Northern Securities Co. v. United States106 (which for all practical 
purposes injected the “rule of reason” into the Court’s Sherman Act 
jurisprudence) and his majority opinion in Church of the Holy Trinity 
v. United States107 (which may well be Brewer’s best-known opinion 
because of its assertion that the United States is a “Christian nation”). 
However, it is certainly true that a compilation of the Supreme Court’s 
most influential opinions, even limited to those of the Fuller Court 
era, would include very few opinions by David Brewer. 
While the small number of significant David Brewer opinions 
helps explain the lack of attention his career has received, it only 
rephrases the question: Why did David Brewer write so few significant 
opinions when he was on the Court for so long? Why didn’t Chief 
Justice Fuller, to whom Brewer was personally quite close throughout 
his years on the Court, assign more significant cases to Brewer? The 
answer most likely lies in Brewer’s failure to articulate a theory of 
constitutional interpretation that relied on anything more than the 
Justice’s intuitive sense of what was constitutional and what was not. 
Although Brewer clearly had strong constitutional values, he rarely 
devoted much of his time to translating his views into tightly reasoned 
constitutional doctrine. 
For Brewer, the key to interpreting the U.S. Constitution lay in 
a set of very broad principles. First, the United States had been 
founded as a Christian nation, and its laws and institutions had to be 
understood in that light.108 Second, Brewer believed that the right of 
moral self-development was a God-given right, the facilitation of 
which was one of the central purposes of government. Laws that 
encouraged moral self-development were legitimate; those that 
impeded it were not. (In this regard, Brewer was greatly influenced by 
 
 105. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170–82 (1904) (Brewer, J., dissenting) 
(standing against the majority on behalf of racial minorities); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488–
93 (1903) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (standing against the majority on behalf of racial minorities); 
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 364–75 (1903) (Fuller, J., dissenting) (allying Brewer with the 
advocates of state power against federal power); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125–60 (1890) 
(Gray, J., dissenting) (same). 
 106. 193 U.S. 197, 360–64 (1904) (Brewer, J. concurring). 
 107. 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
 108. Green, supra note 11, at 450–51; Hylton, Christian Constitution, supra note 11, at 422; 
Przybyszewski, supra note 11, at 472–73. 
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his Yale professor the Reverend Theodore Dwight Woolsey.109) Brewer 
believed that support for moral self-development justified laws against 
vice but otherwise weighed against legislation that was too 
paternalistic. Moral development was the product of free choice, and a 
state that told its citizens what to do and what not to do actually 
hampered its citizens’ moral self-development. Rights of property were 
important because they provided an independent foundation upon 
which moral self-development could occur. 
Third, the link between the religious and moral foundations of 
the state and its constitutional law was recognized by the founding 
documents of the American Republic, although the initial 
incorporation had been incomplete. The Declaration of Independence 
had recognized the Christian rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness (and property), but the original state constitutions and the 
U.S. Constitution of 1789 had been defective, in Brewer’s view, 
because they had provided only partial protection for such rights. That 
problem had been corrected, Brewer believed, by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, whose guarantees of the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship, due process of law, and the equal protection of the laws 
brought the protections of the Declaration of Independence back into 
the Constitution. 
Finally, apart from the recognition of a need for a national 
constitutional principle to protect citizens from excessive 
governmental paternalism, Brewer viewed American federalism from 
a Jeffersonian states’-rights perspective. The state, not the national 
government, was ordinarily the sovereign that mattered, and the 
powers of the national government were to be strictly construed. 
Although Brewer joined the Republican Party in the mid-1850s, it was 
the Grand Old Party’s antislavery views that attracted him and not its 
affiliations to Hamiltonian constitutional theories. 
For Brewer, the primary role of the judge was to ensure that 
these fundamental principles were honored by legislatures. Not every 
exercise of the police power was illegitimate, and it was the role of the 
judge to determine when the line had been crossed. Whether the case 
involved the Contracts Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or some other provision of the Constitution, the judge’s 
job was to distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate exercise 
of state power. However, because these fundamental principles were 
broad and the variety of situations to which they applied was 
immense, the effect of their application to any particular situation was 
 
 109. The following discussion of Brewer’s views in regard to deciding cases is based on 
Hylton, Conservative Justice, supra note 11, at 55. 
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not clear. For Brewer, such decisions were to be made on what was 
essentially a case-by-case basis. The key to such distinctions was the 
good sense of the judge and his appreciation of constitutional values 
rather than the application of some specific analytical formula. 
In deciding constitutional cases, David Brewer evaluated the 
record and the arguments of counsel in light of these larger principles. 
“Lesser” constitutional principles were of no particular use because all 
decisions had to be justified in light of the larger principles. 
Consequently, David Brewer never developed a formula for 
distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable restraints on 
interstate commerce even though he participated in dozens of cases in 
which this was the central issue. The same was true for what 
constituted an impairment of the obligations of contracts or a denial of 
due process. Anticipating Justice Potter Stewart’s observation about 
pornography, David Brewer “knew an unconstitutional use of the 
police power when he saw one,” but he was never able to define 
precisely what made it so.110 Although his judicial opinions contained 
numerous citations to authority, his references were usually to earlier 
pronouncements of general principles rather than to more specific 
constitutional standards applicable to the case at hand. 
For example, Brewer believed that occupational liberty—the 
right to choose a lawful occupation and to negotiate the terms of 
employment—was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although 
he celebrated this right on numerous occasions, he also acknowledged 
that under certain circumstances the right could be qualified. What 
Brewer never developed was a formula—other than his own 
intuitions—for distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate 
regulation of occupational liberty. On the one hand, he was part of the 
liberty of contract majorities in Lochner v. New York111 (which 
involved state limitations on the numbers of hours that bakers could 
work) and Adair v. United States112 (the yellow dog contract case). He 
defended the correctness of the Lochner opinion in his public 
addresses and articles,113 and he dissented in a number of cases in 
which the Supreme Court upheld state restrictions on the employment 
relationship.114 In all of these cases, Brewer presumably found that 
 
 110. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
 111. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 112. 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908). 
 113. E.g., David Josiah Brewer, The Legitimate Exercise of the Police Power in the Protection of 
Health, 21 CHARITIES & COMMONS 238 (1908). 
 114. See McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 551 (1909) (requiring miners paid on the basis of 
coal mined to be paid on the basis of the weight of the coal before screening); Atkin v. Kansas, 
191 U.S. 207, 224 (1903) (limiting hours for public works employees); Knoxville Iron Co. v. 
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the challenged restrictions were unreasonable as a constitutional 
matter; however, in each case, he simply dissented without opinion. 
On the other hand, in Muller v. Oregon,115 he upheld for the 
Court an Oregon statute restricting the number of hours that women 
could work in a week, brushing aside the argument that the issue 
previously had been resolved in the Court’s Lochner decision. For 
Brewer, the principles that guided the moral self-development of men 
did not necessarily apply in the same way to women. The difference 
between men and women could justify a different judicial result even 
when a challenged statute was otherwise identical to the one in 
Lochner. But such distinctions were not limited to gender. A few years 
earlier, in his majority opinion in Patterson v. The Bark Eudora,116 
Brewer rejected a liberty of contract challenge to an act of Congress that 
prohibited the advance payment of seamen’s wages. (The statute was 
designed to prevent ship owners from entrapping sailors into 
disadvantageous contracts by advancing them wages during vulnerable 
moments.) Restraints on occupational liberty were justified in such cases 
because sailors, like women, had been demonstrated to be a vulnerable 
group. In other cases, he voted to uphold an Arkansas statute that pre-
scribed the way in which back wages were to be paid to discharged 
railroad workers, and he joined a unanimous court in upholding a 
congressional act that imposed a maximum eight-hour day for workers 
employed on federal public works projects.117 He also had no problem 
with the phenomenon of occupational licensing or the outright 
prohibition against convicted felons entering certain professions.118 
What was the difference in the legislation in these two groups of 
cases? In the former cases, Brewer believed that the regulations were 
unreasonable, and in the latter he felt that they were not. For an 
explanation as to how the distinction was to be made, Brewer offered 
only that in some situations workers needed the protection of the state 
and in other situations they didn’t. He also seemingly changed his mind 
on certain issues; for example, in spite of his earlier positions, he 
 
Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901) (prohibiting the payment of wages in scrip rather than cash); 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (upholding working hours limitations of individuals 
engaged in the ultra-hazardous activity of underground mining). 
 115. 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). 
 116. 190 U.S. 169, 174 (1903). 
 117. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1907); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & St. Paul 
Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 410 (1899). 
 118. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (affirming the defendant’s conviction 
for the unlawful practice of medicine based on his treating an individual after having been 
convicted of a felony, finding the statute required that one who had violated the state’s criminal 
laws “should be deemed of such bad character as to be unfit to practise medicine”). 
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eventually supported the constitutionality of hours restrictions on 
workers in ultrahazardous settings and on public works projects.119 
A full understanding of Brewer’s thinking on constitutional 
questions also is hampered by his tendency to dissent without opinion 
in constitutional cases. This was particularly true of his dissents in 
labor cases. In Holden v. Hardy,120 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,121 
Atkin v. Kansas,122 and McLean v. Arkansas123 (all discussed above), 
he offered no explanation whatsoever for the grounds of his 
disagreement with the majority. 
One of his most intriguing dissents, and one that could have 
given him the opportunity to explain how to draw the line between 
claims of individual liberty and state regulatory authority, was his 
dissent in the 1905 case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.124 Jacobson 
involved a state statute requiring adults to be vaccinated for smallpox. 
The plaintiff, who claimed to have a special allergy to the smallpox 
vaccine, insisted that the statute was an unconstitutional offense 
against individual liberty. By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court 
disagreed and upheld the statute. Brewer, along with Rufus Peckham, 
dissented, but once again, they did so without opinion. 
Brewer’s written opinions tended to be relatively pro forma 
documents. Brewer typically began his judicial opinions with a 
summary of the facts and a declaration of platitudes, after which he 
often inserted a series of quotations from other opinions from a variety 
of jurisdictions. The precise relevance of the quotations was not 
always clear, but after the citations, he usually moved to a conclusion 
regarding the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the challenged 
law or activity or the appropriateness of the Court’s jurisdiction. When 
Brewer wrote to uphold a statute or municipal ordinance, he usually 
went to some length to explain why the law was reasonable; if he 
found it to be unconstitutional, he usually treated the matter as self-
evident.125 When he chose to write a dissenting opinion, his remarks 
usually were characterized by what might be called courteous outrage. 
 
 119. In Brewer’s 1908 essay, The Legitimate Exercise of the Police Power in the Protection of 
Health, supra note 113, at 239–40, he specifically endorsed the holding in Holden v. Hardy from 
which he had dissented a decade earlier. Brewer’s concurrence in Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 
246, 260 (1907), also indicates a change in mind on the public works issue. 
 120. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 121. 183 U.S. 13 (1901). 
 122. 191 U.S. 207 (1903). 
 123. 211 U.S. 539 (1909). 
 124. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 125. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality of 
state restrictions on the working hours of females, describing the historical enactment of 
protective legislation for women); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 178–79 (1903) 
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Brewer’s approach to opinion writing was not that different 
from his approach to public speaking. His opinions were 
straightforward, though at times a little wordy, and crafted in such a 
way as to grab and hold the attention of a general audience. Although 
such an approach produced quotable maxims—“The paternal theory of 
government is to me odious”; “Looking Backward is nearer than a 
dream”; “The government of the Union, then, is, emphatically and 
truly, a government of the people”; and “This is a Christian 
Nation”126—the approach was unlikely to produce opinions that were 
of important precedential value or likely to be of interest to future 
judges and constitutional scholars. 
At the time of his death, the New York Times described 
Brewer’s lecture style as a product of “straightforward thinking” and 
“plain but always courteous speaking.”127 His judicial opinions 
reflected a similar approach. They were uncomplicated and easy to 
follow, but they rarely showed an appreciation of, or interest in, 
constitutional subtleties. The same New York Times article further 
noted that “[h]is lectures and casual addresses showed that he had 
thought much, studied much, but had been spoiled by neither 
process.”128 One easily could make the same observation in regard to 
his judicial opinions. In deciding cases, Brewer avoided the nuances of 
constitutional law or constitutional interpretation, and his opinions 
rarely were burdened with too much learning or analysis. 
Was there a connection between David Brewer’s relatively 
perfunctory approach to opinion writing and his extensive off-the-
court activities? Perhaps there was. No one ever accused Brewer of 
shirking his duties as a Justice, and the clerk of the court’s record 
book reveals that he was almost always present in the courtroom 
when the Court was in session.129 The volume of his opinions, if not 
the quality, also demonstrates that he carried his part of the Court’s 
 
(holding that it was not beyond the power of Congress to enact legislation, applicable to both 
American and foreign vessels, which made it unlawful to pay any seaman wages in advance). 
 126. See, e.g., Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“The 
paternal theory of government is to me odious.”); id. (“ ‘Looking Backward’ is nearer than a 
dream.”); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 578 (1895) (“The government of the Union, then, is, 
emphatically and truly, a government of the people.”); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (“[T]his is a Christian nation.”). 
 127. Justice Brewer, supra note 14, at 10. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States (1890–1910). The one period of time 
in which Brewer was frequently absent was in 1896 when his service on the Anglo-Venezuelan 
Boundary Commission and the death of one of his daughters in Kansas required him to be away 
from Washington. See Hylton, Judge Who Abstained, supra note 11, at 341–44 (describing the 
reasons for Brewer’s abstention from the Plessy v. Ferguson decision). 
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load. Perhaps if Brewer had devoted more of his free time to his 
judicial duties, he might have become a more sophisticated 
constitutional thinker. However, that individual would have been an 
entirely different person from David Brewer. 
David Brewer was a significant figure in the history of the 
Supreme Court, and he played an extremely important role in the 
public life of his era. His career offers an intriguing case study of how 
the “liberal” ideals of one generation play out over the course of a 
subsequent generation characterized by profound cultural and 
political changes. He was not, however, a sophisticated constitutional 
thinker; once citations to precedent and the language designed for 
popular audiences were subtracted, his opinions were rarely more 
than just votes on the outcomes of cases. When Alan Westin called 
Brewer “the William O. Douglas of the Right,” he probably was 
referring to the political views of the two Justices, but the mid-
twentieth-century liberal maverick and Brewer also shared a similar 
approach to deciding cases and writing judicial opinions.130 As 
Douglas’s once lofty reputation continues to fade, the comparison 
becomes even more apt.131 
The reasons for Brewer’s current obscurity reveal a great deal 
about why some Supreme Court Justices are remembered long after 
their service on the Court and why others, equally prominent in their 
own times, are forgotten. The features that made David Brewer a 
popular public speaker and the best-known Supreme Court Justice of 
his era were also the features that limited his influence on the 
development of constitutional principles. Justice Brewer became a 
neglected Justice after his death because, at least in the realm of 
formal constitutional law, he chose to emphasize results over 
explanations. As a result, he actually had surprisingly little to say. 
 
 
 130. WESTIN, supra note 46, at 24. 
 131. On Douglas, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF 
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 317–68 (3d ed. 2007) (describing Douglas’s thirty-six years on the 
Supreme Court, with particular attention given to Douglas’s autobiographical account of his life). 
